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In an incomplete regulation framework the Regulator cannot replicate all the possible 
outcomes by himself since he has no influence on some firms present in the market. When 
facing asymmetric information regarding the regulated firm’s costs, it may be better for 
the Regulator to allow the other competitors to extract a truthful report from her through 
side-payments in a collusion and therefore the “Collusion-Proofness Principle” may not 
hold. In fact, by introducing an exogenous number of unregulated competitors, Social 
Welfare  differences  seem  to  favour  a  Collusion-Allowing  equilibrium.  However,  such 
result  will  strongly  depend  on  the  relative  importance  given  by  the  Regulator  to  the 
Consumer Surplus. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
The main goal of the present paper is to assess which is the optimal incomplete 
regulation when the marginal  costs of the regulated firm are private information, not 
available to the regulator and neither to the other competitors, and when it is possible to 
form a coalition between these unregulated firms and the regulated firm. We will also 
evaluate how such results may be influenced by the relative importance given by the 
regulator to the Consumer Surplus in the Social Welfare function. 
  Most of the literature on economic regulation studied optimal contracts in the 
context  of  complete  regulation,  either  between  a  regulator  and  a  firm  (monopoly)  or 
between a regulator and all the firms in the market (usually a duopoly).  
  Baron and Myerson (1982), Laffont and Tirole (1986) and Lewis and Sappington 
(1988)  studied  a  monopoly  where  the  main  problem  was  related  to  the  design  of  an 
optimal contract under asymmetric information. On the first two papers the regulator was 
not  aware  of  the  monopolist’s  marginal  costs,  while  in  the  last  work  that  private 
information was related to the market’s demand function. All of these models represent 
departures from the first-best solution due to the presence of incomplete information. The 
regulator has to pay a price above the marginal cost to avoid an untruthful report by the 
monopolist.  However,  Lewis  and  Sappington  (1988)  also  concluded  that  under  some 
conditions (nondecreasing marginal costs), in spite of having private information about 
the demand function, we would get the same first-best optimum equilibrium. 
  Caillaud (1990), Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) and Tangeras (2000) were 
departures  from  the  previously  mentioned  models,  by  extending  optimal  complete 
regulation under asymmetric information to a competition framework. Caillaud (1990) 
focused  on  the  informational  effect  of  the  existence  of  a  competitive  fringe  for  the 
regulation of a dominant firm under asymmetric information. If both the dominant firm’s 
and the fringe’s costs are unknown and positively correlated, the regulator could use the 
threat of entry of that fringe into the market as an endogenous incentive mechanism for 
the dominant firm to always reveal truthfully its costs. It was concluded that the presence 
of  a  fringe  is  always  welfare  enhancing  but  its  magnitude  depends  on  the  degree  of 3 
information correlation and on the characteristics of the demand function. Both Laffont 
and Martimort (1997, 2000) and Tangeras (2000) introduced the possibility of collusion 
between two firms in a context of complete regulation under asymmetric information. 
The  first  mainly  stresses  the  role  of  correlated  information  between  the  firms  as  a 
determinant of the strength of the coalition. They also develop a new methodology to 
analyze  collusion  and  have  concluded  that  in  the  presence  of  correlated  private 
information the regulator can create a regulation contract which can replicate exactly the 
collusion  outcome:  the  Collusion-Proofness  Principle.  Tangeras  (2000)  studied  the 
incentives for collusion when a market is regulated through yardstick competition. The 
regulator was able to design a contract for each firm separately. Since firms decided to 
collude before knowing their own productivity, the collusion would be costly to society 
only if firms could commit to the side payments agreed. 
 Biglaiser and Ma (1995) and Aubert and Pouyet (2006) are two very important 
contributions to the study of optimal regulation when the regulator is only able to make a 
contract  with a dominant firm (incomplete  regulation) under  asymmetric information. 
Biglaiser  and  Ma  (1995)  focuses  on  optimal  incomplete  regulation  when  only  the 
dominant  firm  has  private  information  regarding  the  demand  function  and  the 
unregulated competitor has some market power, acting as a Stackelberg follower. They 
proved that depending on the weight given by the regulator to consumer surplus on Social 
Welfare, the equilibrium outcome could both separating and pooling or just separating. 
Aubert and Pouyet’s (2006) model is the closest to the one I propose.  They have worked 
in a framework of incomplete regulation under asymmetric information and there is the 
possibility of collusion between the two firms operating in the market. Due to product 
imperfect substitutability, the unregulated competitor has incentives to bribe the regulated 
firm such that it overstates its costs and produce less. They have concluded that it is not 
optimal to design a Collusion-Proof contract for regulation. This kind of contract imposes 
both distortions at the bottom and at the top (inefficient and efficient regulated firms, 
respectively), while by allowing collusion the regulator may induce the non-regulated 
firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The Collusion-Proofness Principle will not hold in 
the incomplete regulation framework since the regulator is unable to contract with the 
unregulated firm and therefore it has limited possibilities for contracts when compared to 4 
what can be achieved within the coalition of the two firms. The difference between the 
Collusion-Proof  contract  and  a  contract  that  allows  collusion  is  that  in  the  first  the 
regulator has to pay larger amounts to the regulated firm to ensure that it reveals its 
efficiency  despite  collusion.  In  the  last,  the  regulator  uses  collusion  to  make  the 
unregulated firm pay to ensure that the regulated firm reveals its efficiency. 
Given the previously mentioned literature, the main contribution of the present 
paper is to discuss the role of collusion in the optimal design of incomplete regulation 
under asymmetric information when we introduce more than one unregulated firm into 
the market. In the present framework the market is composed by a dominant (regulated) 
firm and by a small number of unregulated firms, which produce the same homogeneous 
product (although different from the one produced by the regulated firm) and choose their 
quantities  as  Stackelberg  followers.  Similarly  to  Aubert  and  Pouyet  (2006),  I  have 
assumed  that  the  only  private  information  on  the  market  is  the  marginal  cost  of  the 
dominant firm, which can take one of two possible values. Additionally, I have decided 
to  introduce  differentiation  among  unregulated  firms  by  admitting  different  marginal 
costs, which are publicly known. During all the analysis we will also use a similar Social 
Welfare  function  to  the  one  used  by  Aubert  and  Pouyet  (2006)  which  allows  us  to 
compare  the  results  directly.  These  assumptions  may  be  shortcomings  of  the  present 
paper  and  a  reason  for  further  research.  In  reality  it  is  more  likely  the  costs  of  the 
unregulated firms to be also private information and since economic regulation is usually 
decided in terms of price-cap, we should try to assess optimal regulation when firms 
compete using prices. As we will also see further ahead in the paper, by giving more 
weight  to  the  Consumer  Surplus  in  the  Social  Welfare  function  the  conclusions  will 
change  dramatically,  emphasising  the  importance  of  the  regulator’s  priorities  when 
ensuring competition in a market.  
The present paper also has a wide range of empirical applicability. An example is 
the  Portuguese  fixed  telecommunications  market  which  is  constituted  by  a  dominant 
regulated firm (Portugal Telecom) and by a small number of unregulated competitors. 
Once  again,  consumers  view  telecommunications  services  of  Portugal  Telecom  as 
different from the other competitors. We may also apply the model to other sectors as 
Health and Education in Portugal. In each region, we could look at the health-care market 5 
as being composed by one (or two) dominant public (regulated) hospitals and by a small 
number of private hospitals that compete in most of the type of health services. The same 
can be said about the regional market for Undergraduate Degrees. Usually the public 
university is the dominant firm, which is also regulated in terms of tuitions and there is 
also a small number of private universities that are free to impose the tuition they would 
like. However, we must stress that in these last two sectors the unregulated sector is not 
regulated in terms of prices, but it is regulated in terms of minimum level of quality of its 
services. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I will describe the model 
and its characteristics, also describing the timing to better understand the sequence of 
events. In later sections I will analyse the optimal regulation outcome (quantities, prices, 
profits,  transfer  from  the  regulator,  side-payment  from  the  unregulated  firms  to  the 
regulated firm and welfare level) in different frameworks within incomplete regulation: 
complete information, incomplete information in the absence of collusion and incomplete 
information  with  the  possibility  of  collusion.  I  will  then  compare  the  outcome  from 
contracts that are Collusion-Proof with the outcome obtained with contracts that allow 
collusion and assess which one entails a higher level of Social Welfare. Finally, I will 
discuss the importance of the Social Welfare function to the robustness of such findings, 
by  comparing  the  Consumer  Surplus  values  in  Collusion-Proofnes  and  Collusion-













2 – The Model 
 
2.1. – The Firms 
 
The market is composed by a dominant regulated firm 
A F  and by n unregulated 
firms, each denoted by 
B
i F , where i=1,…,n. All the firms compete in quantities. Firm 
A F  has a constant marginal cost 
a θ  which can take two values, θ  or θ ,  0 θ θ θ − ≡   > . 
The value of this marginal cost is private information for
A F , however its distribution is 
public  knowledge:  with  probability  p  
A F   is  efficient  (
a θ θ = )  and  it  is  inefficient 
(
a θ θ = ) with probability  1 p p = − . The unregulated firms have different marginal costs 
(
b
i θ ) which are publicly known. For simplification we have assumed that the unregulated 
firms  are  ordered  from  the  most  efficient  to  the  least  efficient,  such  that: 
1 2 ...
b b b
n θ θ θ ≤ ≤ ≤ .  
 
 
2.2. – The Consumers 
 
The consumers can buy two differentiated products: 
a q  produced by the regulated 
firm in market A and 
b









=∑ represents  the  total  quantity  produced  in  market  B.  The  Gross 
Consumer Surplus when a quantity 
a q  is produced by the firm
A F  and a quantity 
b Q  is 
produced by all the firms in market B, is given by: 
 
2 2 1 1
( , ) ( ) ( )
2 2
a b a a b b a b a b GS q Q d q d Q q Q sq Q = + − − −  
 7 
where the parameter  (0,1) s∈  measures the degree of substitutability between the two 
types of products, whereas the parameter 
j d  represents the size of market , j A B =
3. The 
inverse demand functions for both markets are given by: 
 
( , )
a a b a a b P q Q d q sQ = − −  
( , )
b a b b b a P q Q d Q sq = − −  
 
We  have  also  assumed  that  1
b a b b
n d d θ θ θ θ − = − = − ,  which  means  that  the 
difference between the marginal costs of the most efficient unregulated firm  ( ) 1
b F  and 
the efficient type of 
A F  is exactly the same as the difference between the costs of the 
most inefficient firm in market B ( )
b
n F  and the inefficient type of the regulated firm and 




2.3. – The Regulator 
 
Only firm 
A F  is regulated by the regulator R, while all other competitors are left 
unregulated.  The  regulation  contract  is  composed  by  a  quantity-transfer  pair 




a a a a




, which depends on the message (
a
m θ ) sent by the regulated firm 
about its cost to the regulator. For a given contract  } { ,




( , )             1,...,
a a a b a a a
b b a b b b
i i i
P q Q q t
P q Q q i n
π θ
π θ
  = − −  
  = − ∀ =  
 
   
  Similarly  to  Aubert  and  Pouyet  (2006),  I  have  decided  not  to  consider  any 
relationship between the regulator and any other firm, but that could be considered by 
                                                 
3 Such Consumer Surplus function results from the standard quadratic utility function proposed by Dixit. 
4 We will see later on that the conclusions remain the same if we disregard such assumption.  8 
extending the analysis to a lump-sum tax or taxes proportional either to profits or to 
output. 
I will also assume that the firms’ profits do not enter the objective function of the 
regulator, so that this objective is reduced to net consumer surplus plus the transfer paid 
by the regulated firm. Hence, the rents left to regulated firm are socially costly for the 
regulator since they represent the amount that the regulator has to pay for her to reveal 
truthfully  its  marginal  costs.  The  objective  of  the  regulator  is  to  maximize  Social 
Welfare, given by: 
 
  ( , ) ( , )
a b a a b a b b a W GS q Q q P q Q Q θ π = − − −  
 
 
2.4. – The Timing 
 
In the present model, the agents decide sequentially. The temporal sequence of 
events will be: 
1)  Nature draws one of the two possible values for 
a θ , which is only known to the 
regulated firm 
A F . 




a a a a




to  the  regulated 
firm
A F . 
3)  The regulated firm 
A F  decides whether to accept or reject this contract. In case 
of refusal, it gets a reservation gain exogenously normalized to zero.  If 
A F  
accepts the contract the game continues as follows. 
4)  After accepting the contract and before choosing which signal to give to the 
regulator, the other firms may try to pay 
A F  the amount b such that she claims 
to  be  inefficient:  collusion.  The  incentives  for  collusion  reside  on  the 
substitutability  between  the  different  products.  The  smaller  the  quantity 
produced by the regulated firm, the greater will be the quantity produced and 
the  profits  of  the  firms  in  market  B.  The  collusion  will  be  made  under 9 
asymmetric information since the unregulated firms do not know the true cost 
of
A F . The outcome will be a pair of side-payment and report ( ) ,
a
m b θ .  
5)  After the coalition is made between the firms in the market, 
A F sends a message 
a
m θ   to  the  regulator,  produces  the  corresponding  quantity  and  receives  the 
corresponding transfer. 
6)  All the unregulated firms act as Stackelberg followers, deciding their individual 
quantities simultaneously given the quantity produced by




3 – Optimal regulation with perfect information 
 
For the purpose of this section, let us assume that the firms’ efficiency parameters 
a θ  and 
b
i θ  for  1,..., i n =  are known to all economic agents. The best response function 

















Knowing that all unregulated firms will decide simultaneously their quantities, we 














= − −   +   ∑  
 
 
3.1. – Complete Regulation and Complete Information: the Social Optimum 
 10 
  The  socially  optimal  quantities  ( ) , ,
a b b
opt iopt opt q q Q would  be  the  ones  that  the 
regulator would ideally choose if we had complete information and complete regulation. 
Although this framework is not considered, it becomes a reference benchmark to other 
possible situations. These optimal quantities are such that the prices equal the marginal 
costs


































  Notice that the only two marginal costs relevant for the optimal quantities are the 
ones related to 
A F  and 
B
n F  since they are directly linked to the equilibrium prices for 
both markets. Such quantities also depend positively on their own market dimension and 
negatively on the competitor’s market dimension. It is also worth to mention that none of 
the equilibrium prices of the first-best situation depend on the number of firms in market 
B  (n).    Another  interesting  feature  is  that  the  quantity  produced  by  each  of  the 
unregulated firms is directly given by the absolute costs advantage, leading to a quantity 
equal to zero for the least efficient firm. 
 
 
3.2. – Incomplete Regulation and Complete Information: the second-best 
 
Let us now assume an incomplete regulation framework in which the regulator R 
can only regulate firm 
A F . Since we have seen that the rent of 
A F  is socially costly, the 
regulator  R  in  equilibrium  decides  to  extract  all  the  profits  from  the  regulated  firm. 
Incorporating the aggregate best response function from the unregulated firms into the 
                                                 
5 For the firms operating in market B, the optimal quantities are set by making the price of that product 
equal to the marginal cost of the least efficient firm (firm n). By doing this we are implicitly considering 
entry and exit of firms in the market as exogeneous.  11 
Social Welfare function given previously, the solution yields the following output levels
6 
for any  { } ,
a θ θ θ = : 





* * 2 2
* * 2 2
1
1
( ) ( 1) ( )
( 1) ( )
1
( ( )) ( 1) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( )
1
( ( )) ( )
( 1) ( )
n
a a a a b b
i
i




b a a b b a a
i
i
q n d ns nd
n ns
q q n d s d n ns n s n n
n ns
n
Q q nd ns d
n ns
θ θ θ





   
= + − − −     + −    
 
= + − − + + − + − − +   + −  
+  





Notice that if  0 s =  the two quantities  * ( )
a a q θ  and 
a
opt q  are the same. When the 
two products are independent, the unregulated firms do not compete with the regulated 
firm and therefore there is no way that the regulator can influence their behaviour in an 
incomplete regulation framework. However, when the two products are substitutes, since 
the profits of the unregulated firms are not included in the Social Welfare expression, the 
regulator  will  want  to  incentive  firm 
A F   to  produce  more  such  that  the  Consumer 
Surplus  is  greater,  even  if  that means  smaller profits  for  the  unregulated  firms.  Also 





4 – Optimal incomplete regulation under asymmetric information and 
in the absence of collusion 
 
In this section we will assume that the regulator and all the unregulated firms do 
not  know  the  firm 
A F ’s  actual  marginal  costs,  however  its  distribution  is  publicly 
known.  The  marginal  costs  of  all  unregulated  firms  are  public  knowledge  and  the 
regulator can only influence 
A F , leaving all the other competitors unregulated. For the 
time being we will also disregard the possibility of collusion between all the firms. 
                                                 
6 See appendix A.1. for objective function, constraints and first order conditions. 12 
Accordingly to the timing defined previously, after 
A F  deciding which quantity 
to produce the other competitors will simultaneously  choose how much they  want to 
produce by their respective best response functions. Therefore, even in the presence of 
incomplete regulation, we can assume that the Revelation Principle will still hold
7 and we 
can focus the attention of the regulator R to direct and truthful contracts. We will denote 
( , )
a a a
m π θ θ  as the profits for firm 
A F  when the marginal cost is 
a θ  and she reports to the 
regulator  to  have  the  marginal  cost 
a
m θ ,  ( )
a a a q q θ ≡   as  the  quantity  that  should  be 
produced by the regulated firm when inefficient and  ( )
a a a q q θ ≡  the quantity produced 
when 
A F  is efficient. We will concentrate our analysis on the profits  ( , )
a a a a π π θ θ ≡ and 
( , )
a a a a π π θ θ ≡  which represent the rents for the efficient and inefficient regulated firms 
at a truthful equilibrium, respectively. Let us also denote 
b Q and 
b Q as the total quantity 
produced in market B when firm 
A F  is inefficient and efficient, respectively.  
The problem  for the regulator will be to maximize Social Welfare, subject to 
incentive compatibility (ICC) and participation constraints (PC), which can be written as 
follows: 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( )
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2 2
. .
      0                     (PC for  )
      0        
a a
a a b b a b a b a b b a b a
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E W p d q d Q q Q sq Q q d Q sq Q






  = + − − − − − − − − +  
 
  + − − − − − − − −  
 
≥
≥              (PC for  )
            (ICC for  )






π π θ θ




Usually  in  this  kind  of  problems  only  the  Participation  Constraint  for  the 
inefficient 
A F  and the Incentive Compatibility Constraint for the efficient regulated firm 
are binding. Then, plugging these constraints into the objective function and using the 
first order conditions we get that: 
                                                 







* 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1
( 1) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( )
1 ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
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a a b b a
i
i
q n d ns nd q
n ns
p p n n
q n d ns nd q
n ns n ns n ns p p
θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
=
=
   
= + − − − =     + −    
  + +  





In the case where the firms cannot collude and under asymmetric information and 
incomplete regulation we can verify that the standard no distortion at the top equilibrium 
in an adverse selection model holds. An efficient firm 
A F  will produce the complete 
information output, but the regulator needs to leave an information rent of 
a q θ    to this 
firm in order to induce a truthful revelation of its efficiency. Since this rent increases with 
the quantity produced by the inefficient firm
A F , it will be distorted downward relatively 
to the respective complete information quantity. This informational rent that we take to 
a q  will be greater the greater the probability that the firm 
A F  will be efficient and the 
more  substitutable  the  products  of  the  two  markets  are.  In  these  two  cases,  the 
consequences  for  the  expected  Social  Welfare  of  decreasing  the  quantity  for  the 
inefficient regulated firm are minimized since the risk of having an inefficient 
A F  is 
lower and because the consumers can more easily compensate this decrease in  
a q  by 
consuming  more  from  the  other  unregulated  firms.  This  informational  rent  will  also 
increase with the number of unregulated firms n. Once again, a lower 
a q  will bring 
smaller  distortions  to  the  expected  Social  Welfare  since  the  ability  of  capture  higher 
profits of the unregulated firms will be very low when they are many. 
At this point we should also notice that due to product substitutability there is a 
stake for collusion
8. We have seen that the Incentive Compatibility Constraint for the 
efficient 
A F   will  lead  to 
a a q q ≥   leading  to  , 1,...,
b b
i i i n π π ≥ ∀ =   and  therefore  the 
unregulated  firms  have  incentives  to  make  the  regulated  firm  always  pretend  to  be 
inefficient.  Since  this  increase  in  the  profits  for  the  unregulated  firms  will  play  an 
important role in the next section, we will denote 
b b b
i i i π π π   ≡ −  as the increase in the 
                                                 
8 Proof in the appendix A.2. 14 
profits of firm i in the unregulated sector by having firm 
A F  producing  
a q  instead of 




5  –  Optimal  regulation  under  asymmetric  information  and  with  the 
possibility of collusion 
 
As it was previously mentioned, it is possible for the firms to collude such that the 
firm 
A F  always reports to be inefficient to the regulator. Such decision to collude takes 
place after the firm 
A F  knows its true costs but before deciding which costs to report to 
the regulator. To model collusion under asymmetric information we are going to use a 
similar methodology used by Laffont and Martimort (1999, 2000) and Aubert and Pouyet 
(2006). Since 
a θ  is private information at the time that the collusion takes place, we can 
model  the  bargaining  process  within  the  coalition  by  considering  a  hypothetical 
benevolent mediator M whose objective is to maximize the aggregate expected profits of 
all  the  firms  in  the  coalition,  subject  to  participation  and  incentive  compatibility 
constraints. This mediator M can be viewed as another Principal to whom the Revelation 
Principle applies: the mediator will offer a collusive agreement such that all firms are 
willing to participate and firm 
A F  truthfully reports its type to the coalition We should 
also notice that since the marginal costs of all the unregulated firms are public knowledge 
they cannot deviate from their best response function to a certain report from the firm 
A F , leading to an immediate detection of the collusion from an antitrust authority, which 
we don’t model explicitly but is present nevertheless. Conversely, this authority does not 
detect any type of collusion between the firms if they act accordingly to the report firm 
A F  made to the regulator. 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  study  to  which  extent  the  Collusion-Proofness 
Principle stated by Laffont and Martimort (1999, 2000) holds in the present framework. 
With  complete  regulation,  there  is  no  loss  of  generality  in  only  to  concentrate  on 
regulation contracts that will replicate the collusion outcomes since the Regulator is able 15 
to enforce any output to all firms in the market. However, as already pointed out by 
Aubert and Pouyet (2006), in an incomplete regulation setting the regulator is not able to 
replicate all possible outcomes using a regulation contract and therefore we should not 
restrict attention only to those contracts that avoid collusion. All situations that involve a 
side-payment from the unregulated firms to the regulated firm 
A F  are out of reach from 
the regulator’s point of view since he cannot impose any tax on any firm 
B
i F which could 
replicate those payments. By comparing the Social Welfare from Collusion-Proofness 
Contracts with the Welfare obtained through contracts that allow collusion we are able to 
assess about the robustness of the Collusion-Proof Principle. 
 
 
5.1. – Collusion-Proof Contracts 
 
We start by focusing on Collusion-Proof Contracts, which are contracts that will 
induce  a  passive  response  from  the  coalition.  When  designing  such  a  contract,  the 
mediator will ask firm 
A F  to truthfully report its marginal costs to the regulator and no 
side-payment will be made from the unregulated firms to 
A F . 
Let  us  denote  ( )
a a
m θ θ   as  the  report  recommended  by  the  mediator  when  the 
marginal cost of firm 
A F  is 
a θ  and let  ( )
nc a θ θ  be the report that firm 
A F  would made 
to  the  regulator  if  no  collusion  occurs.  In  case  of  collusion,  the  regulated  firm  will 
produce  ( )
a a
m q θ  and each of the unregulated firms would have to produce  ( )
b a
i m q θ  and 
pay firm 
A F  the amount  ( )
a
i b θ , where 
1





B b θ θ
=
=∑  represents the aggregate side-
payment made to firm 
A F .  
The problem for the mediator is to maximize the coalition’s aggregate profits 
subject  to  the  Participation  Constraints  (PC)  for  all  firms  and  to  the  Incentive 
Compatibility Constraints (ICC) for both types of the regulated firm such that it will 
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( ( ), ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ),   ICC for F
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )),  1,..., , PC for F
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )),  1,..., , PC for F
a
a a a a a
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π θ θ θ θ π θ θ θ θ
π θ θ θ π θ θ
π θ θ θ π θ θ
+ ≥ +
− ≥ ∀ =
− ≥ ∀ =
 
 
  Using the same methodology as Aubert and Pouyet (2006) it is also possible to 
prove  that  in  the  case  of  a  Collusion-Proof  contract,  the  regulator  is  able  to  use  the 
information asymmetry within the coalition to create a regulation contract which leads to 
“individual” truthful revelation of its type by firm 
A F . Hence, the ICC for the inefficient 
type will not be binding and the collusive equilibrium would be the same as in complete 
information
9. This result is opposite to the one found by Laffont and Martimort (2000) in 
a complete regulation context, where asymmetric information generated inefficiencies in 
the functioning of the coalition.  
  By  solving  the  mediator’s  problem  we  get  the  Collusion-Proofness  Constraint 
which the regulator needs to include in his design of the regulation contract problem in 






a a a b
i
i
q π π θ π
=
≥ +  +   ∑  
 
  This result is consistent with the constraint reached by Aubert and Pouyet (2006) 
for the case of two firms. Such constraint can be understood intuitively: an efficient firm 
A F  is willing to report truthfully its marginal costs whenever its profits from telling the 
truth are greater than the ones she would get by pretending to be inefficient plus the 
                                                 
9 See proof in the appendix A.3. 
10 See proof in the appendix A.3. 17 
highest amount of bribe that the unregulated firms are willing to give to firm 
A F  (which 
is equal to the increase on their profits when the regulated firms misleads the regulator). 
  By  solving  the  regulator’s  problem,  including  now  the  Collusion-Proofness 
constraint derived above, the best separating collusion-proof contract is characterized by 
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   
= + − − + −     + − +    
      
= + − −   − − −                  + − −  
 
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  Notice  that  both  quantities  are  distorted  when  compared  with  the  complete 
information  outcomes  already  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  and  that  this  best 
collusion-proof contract is separating only if 
a a
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n
a a b b
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i




   
= + − − −     + −     ∑  
 
Which is the complete information outcome if 
A F  was inefficient. 
 
With collusion-proof contracts, the regulator has to provide firm 
A F  with an extra 
rent in order to compensate for any side-payment that it might get through collusion. 
Since  such  amount  is  affected  by  the  quantity  produced  by  both  an  efficient  and  an 
inefficient firm 
A F , they will be distorted downward to minimize the cost of inducing 
                                                 
11 See proof in the appendix A.3. 
12 See proof in the appendix A.3. 18 
truthful revelation, contrary to the standard result of no distortion at the top. In fact, to 
ensure Collusion-Proofness, the regulator has to reduce simultaneously the rent 
a
cp q θ    








  ∑ . The first demands a decrease in 
a
cp q  while the second 
demands simultaneously a decrease in 
a
cp q  and an increase of 
a
cp q  to bring these two 
quantities closer to each other. We have thus two opposite effects on 
a
cp q . As in Aubert 
and Pouyet (2006) we can verify that such quantity will be smaller than in the case with 
no  possibility  of  collusion,  concluding  that  the  first  effect  dominates  the  second 
mentioned.  
The second objective of bringing both quantities closer together  also conflicts 
with  the  condition  of  sustainability  of  a  separating  equilibrium  for  collusion-proof 
contracts: 
a a
cp cp q q ≥ . When taken to an extreme, a pooling equilibrium may emerge. Such 








  ∑  is very large 
and  very  sensitive  to  regulated  quantities.  This happens  when  the  profitability  of  the 










  ∑  and when the scale of production ( )
a a q q +  of 
firm 
A F  is low. Contrary  to the findings of Aubert and Pouyet  (2006), the stake of 
collusion does not depend monotonically on the substitutability between the products. It 
becomes larger for an increase in s when the products are almost independent (s close to 
zero)  and  it  also  becomes  larger  for  a  decrease  in  s  for  almost  perfect  substitutable 
products (s close to one). The stake of collusion is also larger for a small number of firms 








5.2. – Collusion-Allowing Contracts 
 
As already mentioned, with incomplete regulation we cannot rule out contracts 
that  allow  collusion  since  there  are  some  outcomes  only  attainable  by  taxing  the 
unregulated firms and therefore unattainable by the regulator alone. A potential benefit of 
contracts inducing active collusion is precisely the possibility of extracting some rents 
from  the  unregulated  firms  and  direct  them  towards the  regulated  firm  through  side-
payments.  Allowing  collusion,  the  regulated  firm 
A F   will  have  higher  utility  and 
therefore will be more willing to accept the regulation contract even if it yields higher 
taxes.  
As  in  the  Aubert  and  Pouyet  (2006)  model,  it  is  possible  to  show  that  the 
Revelation  Principle  still  applies  to  the  present  framework,  where  the  “agent”  to  be 
considered is the coalition as a whole and no longer the regulated firm only
13.  Hence, we 
can restrict our attention to direct mechanisms which induce active collusion and truthful 
reports from the coalition.  The regulator must now include in its problem the Incentive 
Compatibility Constraint and the Participation Constraint for the coalition as a whole as 
well as the Incentive Compatibility Constraints and Participation Constraints internal to 
the coalition, which will reflect the expected aggregate profits. Therefore, the regulator’s 
problem may be written as: 
 
{ }
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2













a a b b a b a b a b b a b a
q q b b
a a b b a b a b a b b a b a
E W p d q d Q q Q sq Q q d Q sq Q






  = + − − − − − − − − +  
 




                                                 







        ICC for coalition ( )
        ICC for coalition ( )
0                                    PC for coalition ( )
0
n n


















π π π θ π θ







+ ≥ +  +






∑                                     PC for coalition ( )
( ) ( ( ), ),                       PC for F
( ) ( ( ), ),                       PC for F
( ) ( ( ), ) ( ),            
a a nc a







π θ π θ θ θ
π θ π θ θ θ
π θ π θ θ θ θ
+ ≥
+ ≥
+ ≥ + ICC for F
( ) ( ( ), ) ( ),            ICC for F
( ) ( ( )),  1,..., ,       PC for F
( ) ( ( )),  1,..., ,       PC for F
a
a a a a
m
b b nc b
i i i i
b b nc b




π θ π θ θ θ θ
π θ π θ θ
π θ π θ θ
+ ≥ +
− ≥ ∀ =
− ≥ ∀ =
 
   
Given the monotonicity condition that 
a a
ac ac q q ≥ , the last six constraints will not 
























 Hence,  the  best  contract  with  active  collusion  is  then  characterized  by  the 
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   
= + − − + −     − + +    
     
= + − −   − + −       − + +      








  By comparing these quantities with the ones we have obtained when the contract 
was collusion-proof we can verify that 
a a
ac cp q q =  and 
a a
ac cp q q < . This can be intuitively 
understood. By allowing collusion, the regulator is aware the firm 
A F  will have higher 
profits when reports to be inefficient through the side-payments made by the other firms 
in the unregulated sector. Hence, instead of rewarding the efficiency report the regulator 
penalizes  even  further  firm 
A F   if  she  reports  as  being  inefficient.    Another  way  of 
understanding this result is that when  allowing  active collusion, the  regulator is now 
internalizing not only the benefit that consumers derive from consumption of the good 
b q  
but  also  the  profits  that  this  consumption  generates,  which  will  be  forward  to  the 
regulated firm 
A F  through side-payments. Hence, imposing lower quantities for 
A F  will 
increase the profits of the unregulated firms and therefore smaller will be the share that 
the regulator needs to transfer himself to 
A F .  
 
5.3. – Equilibrium quantities Comparison 
 
  From  this  section  onwards,  due  to  algebraic  complexity  we  have  decided  to 
compare  quantities,  Social  Welfare  and  Consumer  Surplus  using  graphical 
representations as a result of a computational simulation (using Matlab) using a set of 
parameters
14.  We  will  start  by  comparing  the  firm 
A F ’s  and  the  unregulated  firms’ 
equilibrium quantities for the both types of contracts. 
                                                 
14 See appendix A.5. for parameter values used and detailed description of the simulation.  22 
Firstly we will analyse how the equilibrium quantities produced by the firm 
A F  
change with the number of competitors: 









CP Quantity for Efficient A (s = 0.2)































CP Quantity for Inefficient A (s = 0.2)



































AC Quantity for Efficient A (s = 0.2)



































AC Quantity for Inefficient A (s = 0.2)




























  From  the  above  diagrams  we  can  see  that  there  is  a  negative  (and  convex) 
relationship between the quantities produced by firm 
A F  and the amount of competitors 
it faces in the unregulated market. Although the graphs chosen as an example reflect a 
relatively low substitutability between the products of the two markets, we can see that 
when the number of competitors remains low but increases (between 1 and 10) this has a 
dramatic effect in the quantity produced by 
A F .  The same happens for other values of 
the substitutability degree (as we will see later on), where the quantity of 
A F  will tend to 
zero after a certain threshold in the number of competitors.  
  The  following  graphs  allow  us  to  better  understand  how  the  two  types  of 
equilibrium quantities for 
A F  and for all unregulated firms are related: 23 









CP and AC Quantities for Efficient A (s = 0.2)











































CP and AC Quantities for Inefficient A (s = 0.2)















































CP and AC Total Quantity for B, when Efficient A (s = 0.2)






















































CP and AC Total Quantity for B, when Inefficient A (s = 0.2)
















































  From  above,  we  can  see  that  an  efficient 
A F   it  will  not  matter  if  we  allow 
collusion or not, as already expected. However, if firm 
A F  is inefficient then we have 
different levels of output across the two situations. 
A F ’s quantities tend to be lower when 
we allow for collusion, which is an evidence that the competitors are able to detect firm 
A F ’s inefficiency and that the “Truth-telling Constraint” holds.  We should also notice 
the intuitive result that the total output produced in market B increases with the number 
of firms belonging to that market and that it is slightly higher in the situation where we 
allow for collusion. 
The following diagrams compare firm 
A F ’s equilibrium outcomes both for the 
Collusion-Allowing  and  for  Collusion-Proof  situations  for  different  levels  of  the 
substitutability degree. 24 









AC and CP Quantities for Efficient A (n = 2)












































AC and CP Quantities for Inefficient A (n = 2)

















































AC and CP Quantities for Efficient A (n = 5)
































A AC = CP









AC and CP Quantities for Inefficient A (n = 5)







































  We  can  immediately  notice  that  when  firm 
A F   is  efficient  its  equilibrium 
quantities are approximately the same across the two possible situations, similarly to the 
previously made analysis regarding the number of unregulated firms. However, when 
firm 
A F   is  inefficient  its  Collusion-Proof  quantities  are  greater  than  the  equilibrium 
quantities when collusion is allowed. Once more, this is evidence that when designing the 
collusive  agreement,  the  unregulated  firms  are  able  to  extract  from 
A F   some  of  the 
truthful information about its costs.  
  The results obtained for increasing values of the substitutability degree are also 
very  intuitive.  If  firm 
A F   is  efficient  its  equilibrium  quantities  will  increase,  as  the 
consumers start to perceive the two products as close substitutes. The opposite happens 
when  firm 
A F   is  inefficient,  where  its  quantities  decrease  with  the  degree  of 
substitutability and becoming zero after a certain threshold.  25 
  It is also worth mentioning that the level of equilibrium quantities for 
A F  also 
decrease when we increase the number unregulated firms from two to five, and such 
pattern continues throughout the rest of the levels considered. 
 
  
5.4. – Social Welfare differences 
 
  As previously mentioned, in an incomplete regulation framework the Collusion-
Proofness  Principle  put  forth  by  Laffont  and  Martimort  (2000)  may  not  hold  and 
therefore we should also pay attention to regulation contracts that induce an active role by 
the coalition. The goal of this section is to compare the levels of Social Welfare obtained 
by a collusion-proof contract and by a contract that allows collusion.  
  Let us start by looking at the differences between the value of expected Welfare 
when we change the number of unregulated firms in market B. 
 












Welfare Difference: AC - CP
























  From the above diagram we can clearly see that the Welfare Difference is always 
positive,  meaning  that  the  Collusion-Allowing  Equilibrium  always  entails  a  higher 
expected Welfare than the one  given by Collusion-Proof Contracts. Furthermore, this 
value  is  increasing  with  the  number  of  unregulated  firms  and  its  level  is  slightly 26 
increasing with substitutability degrees. Such result can be justified in two ways. First, as 
we have argued before, the advantage of allowing collusion is that the unregulated firms 
in an effort of collude and decide side-payments will eventually lead firm 
A F  to reveal 
its real costs, eliminating part of the information asymmetry. Such result would entail a 
much  higher  cost  for  the  Regulator  if  Collusion  was  not  allowed.  Secondly,  as  the 
number of unregulated firms increases the quantity and the relative weight of firm 
A F  on 
the total output produced by both markets decreases and therefore it will also decrease its 
importance in terms of Social Welfare. 
  Next,  we  will  analyze  the  influence  of  the  substitutability  degree  on  Welfare 
differences, similarly to Aubert and Pouyet (2006). Additionally, such analysis will be 
taken across four different values for the number of firms in market B.   
  










Welfare Difference: AC - CP

























  From the previous graph we can draw the same conclusions made previously for 
the number of unregulated firms. The Welfare differences are always positive, which 
means  that  the  Collusion-Allowing  equilibrium  leads  to  greater  Social  Welfare.  This 
Welfare  difference  increases  with  the  degree  of  substitutability  meaning  that  as  the 
products are seen as close substitutes, the two markets are also seen as closer and the 
weight  that  firm 
A F   has  in  the  total  output  and  in  Social  Welfare  is  much  smaller. 
Additionally,  by  allowing  Collusion  the  unregulated  firms  are  able  to  decrease  the 27 
information asymmetry in the economy and therefore the bias it will have on the Welfare. 
Once again, we can also notice that the level of Welfare difference increases with the 
number of unregulated firms.  
  Finally it is also worth mentioning that such analysis still holds when the range of 
values  for  the  unregulated  firms’  marginal  costs  increases,  creating  new  firms  more 
efficient  than  the  efficient 
A F   and  other  firms  that  are  more  inefficient  than  the 
inefficient regulated firm
15. The only difference lies in the level of values for the Welfare 
differences, they are still increasing and strictly positive but for even greater values. Such 
result  may  be  intuitively  explained  by  the  fact  that  with  increasing  marginal  costs 
differences across firms, the Regulator not only doesn’t need to impose costs on society 
by creating incentives to extract marginal costs information from 
A F  but also the risk 
that an effective collusion might appear is much lower.  
 
5.5. – The importance of Consumer Surplus differences 
 
  From  previous  analysis  a  somewhat  paradoxal  result  was  raised:  it  is  always 
Welfare improving to allow collusion between the regulated firm 
A F and the unregulated 
firms. In their paper, Aubert and Pouyet (2006) have already stated the failure of the 
Collusion-Proofness for some values of the substitutability degree and we were able to 
prove that if a new dimension is added to the model (an exogeneous fixed number of 
unregulated firms) this result is reinforced. The reasons behind such conclusion were also 
already stated. In an incomplete regulation framework the Regulator has no control over 
most  of  the  firms  and  therefore  he  cannot  replicate  through  contract  design  all  the 
possible outcomes. Hence, it will be socially less costly to allow the unregulated firms, 
through side-payment in a collusion, to extract firm 
A F ’s information regarding her true 
marginal costs. Before such evidence, why do we still prohibit collusion? The answer 
may be given if we look only at Consumer Surplus instead of Social Welfare. 
 
                                                 
15 Results and diagrams are in the appendix A.5. 28 











Consumer Surplus Difference: AC - CP

























Consumer Surplus Difference: AC - CP




















  By observing the two previous graphs, the first and most important conclusion is 
that  Active  Collusion  will  always  entail  lower  values  of  Consumer  Surplus  than  the 
situation where Collusion-Proofness holds. By allowing collusion, the aggregate quantity 
produced by both the regulated and unregulated markets will be lower
16 and therefore the 
prices  will  be  higher,  which  together  will  harm  consumers.  However,  the  number  of 
unregulated  firms  and  the  substitutability  degree  will  have  opposite  effects  on  the 
consumer surplus. As the number of unregulated firms increases the consumer surplus 
differences will decrease, while such differences will increase with the substitutability 
degree. Once again both results can be explained by the differences on the aggregate 
quantity  produced.  When  the  number  of  unregulated  firms  increases  we  have  a 
convergence  between  the  levels  of  quantities  produced  as  for  increases  in  the 
substitutability degree will lead to greater differences between the Collusion-Allowing 
and the Collusion-Proof outcomes.  
  Hence, a new and important conclusion rises from this analysis: Social Welfare 
differences  will  depend  heavily  on  the  relative  weight  that  the  regulator  gives  to 
Consumer Surplus on Social Welfare. The importance of this fact was also pointed out by 
Biglaiser and Ma (1995) and here lies the greatest argument against collusion even in a 
framework as the one presented in this paper.  
 
 
                                                 
16 See the graphs in section 5.3.. 29 
 
6 – Conclusion 
   
  The main purpose of this paper was to add a new dimension to the model put forth 
by Aubert and Pouyet (2006), by introducing an exogeneous number of unregulated firms 
in the market, however it was also able to produce a powerful argument against collusion 
even in situation when apparently it would be Welfare improving to allow it. 
Auber and Pouyet (2006) proposed a model of incomplete regulation in a duopoly 
with asymmetric information regarding the costs of the regulated firm, in a context of 
product  differentiation.  The  main  conclusion  of  that  paper  was  the  failure  of  the 
“Collusion-Proofness  Principle”,  which  stated  that  higher  Social  Welfare  would  be 
attained if the regulator would design a contract with the regulated firm that prevented 
any  form  of  collusion  between  the  two  of  them.  In  fact,  they  have  proven  that  for 
decreasing  substitutability  degrees  the  Social  Welfare  would  be  maximized  in  the 
situation where the regulator would allow collusion between firms and not when it is 
prevented.  They  argued  that  such  result  could  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  through 
collusion the unregulated firm could extract a truthful cost information from the regulated 
firm and the regulated firm’s costs information would be obtained at a much lower social 
cost than what it would have if such task would be left to the Regulator alone.  
  The present model extends such context to a case where the regulated firm faces 
competition from n unregulated firms and analyses how the conclusions drawn by Aubert 
and Pouyet (2006) would hold. Although this added dimension lead to a much more 
mathematically  demanding  model,  it  has  reinforced  the  failure  of  the  “Collusion-
Proofness Principle”.  As the number of unregulated competitors increases, the Welfare 
difference  between  the  Collusion-Allowing  equilibrium  and  the  Collusion-Proof 
equilibrium  is  always  positive  and  increasing.  Such  result  may  be  justified  by  the 
decreasing weight of the regulated firm in the aggregated market and on Social Welfare 
and  by  the  ability  that  the  unregulated  firms  have to  extract  the  truthful  information 
regarding the costs. A similar result holds when we study the impact of substitutability on 
the Welfare difference. Nevertheless, by analysing the Consumer Surplus differences we 
were able to find the most powerful argument why the regulator should still not allow 30 
collusion.  Results  presented  earlier  depend  heavily  on  the  relative  weight  that  the 
regulator gives to Consumer Surplus in the Social Welfare function. This new fact brings 
a new perspective on the results reached by Aubert and Pouyet (2006). 
  However some further research may still be made by adding further dimensions to 
the present model. First and foremost, we could start by analysing the role of the weight 
of the Consumer Surplus in the Social Welfare function in the simpler framework of 
Aubert  and  Pouyet  (2006).  Secondly,  we  have  assumed  up  to  this  moment  that  the 
marginal costs for the unregulated sector were public knowledge. We can study what 
would happen if we had again only two firms (one regulated and the other unregulated) 
and both of them had marginal costs which were private information. Another way of 
improving the model is to introduce endogeneity in the number of unregulated firms 
operating  in  the  market,  by  introducing  entry  and  exit.  Another  idea  would  be  to 
introduce the possibility of collusion between the regulated firm and only some of the 




















A.1. Incomplete Regulation and Complete Information 
 
  The problem for the regulator when he cant influence any of the firms in market B 
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A.2. Proof for the existence of a stake for collusion 
 
  There are incentives for collusion since the unregulated firms are better off, by 
product  substitutability,  if  the  firm 
A F   produces  the  quantity  corresponding  to  her 
inefficient type.  
  Using the aggregate reaction function for the firms in market B, and by plugging 
the equilibrium quantities for 
A F , we get that: 
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  which proves that the aggregate quantity produced by the firms in market B is 
greater when the firm 
A F  is inefficient. Substituting both 
b Q  and 
a q  we get the same 
conclusion for an individual firm 
b
j F , for any  1,..., j n = : 
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  and  substituting  this  into  the  individual’s  profit  function  for  any  firm  in  the 
unregulated market, we have that: 
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  hence, each firm in market B will have higher profits if firm 
A F  is inefficient and 
therefore there is a stake for collusion. 
 
 




  As stated before, the collusion-proof contracts are the ones  yielding a  passive 
response from the coalition. Since we have a sequence of decisions about the collusion 
and  about  the  regulatory  contract,  the  first  step  is  to  solve  the  mediator’s  problem 
presented earlier.  33 
  Let us denote by  ( )
k a v θ  the multiplier of the coalition participation constraint for 
the firm k = a, b and by  ( )
a a δ θ  the multiplier of the coalition incentive compatibility 
constraint for each of the types of 
A F . Solving that problem with respect to the bribes 
yields two first-order conditions that can be combined to obtain a relationship between 
those multipliers: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),    1,...,
a b b a
i i v v v v i n θ θ θ θ − = − ∀ =  
   
  By plugging the above expression into the mediator’s problem, it is possible to 
separate the collusion problem with respect to reports into two parts: 
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  To  ensure  collusion-proofness  the  regulator  must  offer  a  contract  such  that  it 
always  leads  to  a  truth-telling  decision  from  the  collusion  problem,  meaning  that 
( )
a
m θ θ θ =  and  ( )
a
m θ θ θ =  have to maximize the two objective functions stated above. 
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  Let us consider for the time being only the first collusion-proofness constraint, 
related  to  the  efficient 
A F   and  check  later  that  the  last  one  will  always  be  satisfied 
afterwards. We should also notice that if the regulator induces a truthful report, none of 
the  unregulated  firms  is  willing  to  pay  any  bribe  to 
A F ,  meaning  that 34 
( ) ( ) 0,  i=1,...,n i i b b θ θ = = ∀   and  that  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  for  the 
inefficient 
A F  can be rewritten as  ( , ) ( , )
a a a q π θ θ π θ θ θ ≥ −  , which is exactly the same 
constraint as the incentive compatibility constraint for an inefficient 
A F  in the regulator’s 
problem. Hence, if this constraint is not binding in the regulator’s problem for the best 
collusion-proof  contract,  the  multiplier  ( )
a δ θ   equals  to  zero,  and  the  collusion-proof 
constraint  for  the  efficient 
A F   is  the  same  as  with  perfect  information  within  the 
coalition: 
1
( , ) ( , )
n
a a a b
i
i
q π θ θ π θ θ θ π
=
≥ +  +   ∑ . 
 
The best separating collusion-proof contract 
 
  Lets start by  assuming  that  ( )
a δ θ  is not equal to zero, which means that the 
incentive compatibility constraint for the inefficient 
A F  is not binding in the regulator’s 
problem. Hence the collusion-proofness constraint is more stringent that the incentive 
compatibility constraint and the only binding conditions for the regulator’s problem are 
the participation constraint for the inefficient 
A F  and the collusion-proofness constraint 
for the efficient 
A F . We have now to check that the equilibrium quantities will satisfy the 
incentive compatibility constraint for the inefficient 
A F , i.e., 
a a q q ≥ .  Knowing that 
( )
2 b b
i i q π = , we get that: 
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  Plugging this expression into the binding constraints we have that: 
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  Substituting  these  conditions  into  the  regulator’s  problem  and  rearranging  the 
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  To  check  if  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  for  the  inefficient 
A F   is 
satisfied we need to prove that 
a a
cp cp q q ≥ , hence: 
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  Which  is  always  greater  than  zero  for  a  small  enough  s.  Therefore,  if  this 
condition is satisfied then the incentive compatibility constraint for the best collusion-
proof contract for an inefficient 
A F  is not binding and the relevant collusion proofness 
constraint is indeed the same as if the coalition was under complete information. This 
proves the claim that  ( )
a δ θ  is equal to zero and the equilibrium quantities will simplify 
as in the text. However if this is not satisfied, then the best collusion-proof contract will 
entail pooling.  
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The best pooling collusion-proof contract 
 
  If the previous conditions does not hold, the best collusion-proof contract will 
entail a pooling equilibrium where the regulator imposes always the same quantity 
a q  
and therefore no collusion will take place. Hence, the best pooling quantity is the full 
information one for an inefficient firm 
A F . 
 
 
A.4. Application of the Revelation Principle to Collusion-Allowing Contracts 
 
  We will now consider the contracts that do not impose a passive response from 
the coalition: the Collusion-Allowing contracts. First we will prove that the Revelation 
Principle still applies in the present framework and we can concentrate in direct and 





  Let  us  start  by  considering  the  mediator’s  problem.  The  Revelation  Principle 
applies and we can consider only direct truthful mechanisms  ￿ { } : , m θ θ   → ×￿ , mapping 
a  truthful  report 
a θ   by 
A F   into  an  allocation  ￿ { } ( ), ( )
a a m b θ θ .  For  simplicity,  let  us 
denote  ￿( ) m m θ ≡  and  ￿( ) m m θ ≡ . The mediator’s problem can then be written as: 37 
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The next definition will allow us to distinguish clearly the incentive constraints 
coming from the mediator’s problem from the ones coming from the regulator’s problem.  
 
Definition 1: A message response m(.) that associates some messages m  and m  in     to 
θ  and θ  respectively is said to be C-incentive feasible if and only if there exists a couple 
{ }
2 ( ), ( )
n
i i b b θ θ ∈￿   such  that  all  the  constraints  of  the  mediator’s  problem  are 
simultaneously satisfied for{ }
1 , , ( ), ( )
n
i i i m m b b θ θ
= . 
 
Let us denote by ϑ  a subset of    ×  as the set of C-incentive feasible message 
responses and by  { } ,
T T m m  the solution of the maximization of the aggregated firms’ 
profits. Then we have that: 
  { }
{ }
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, 1 1
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n n
T T a b a b
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Lemma 1: If { } , m m  is C-incentive feasible given an initial message space   , then it 
remains so when the message space is reduced to { } ,





Proof:  All  the  2n+4  constraints  cane  be  satisfied  for  the  restricted  message  space. 
Considering the participation constraint for the efficient 
A F , if { } , m m  is feasible for     
then that constraint will be satisfied and there exists a vector given by { } 1 ( )
n
i i b θ
=  such that 
( , ) ( ) ( ( ), )
a a nc m B m π θ θ π θ θ + ≥ .  By  definition  of  the  non-collusive  best  response  we 
have  that  { } ( ( ), ) max ( , ), ( , )
a nc a a m m m π θ θ π θ π θ ≥ .  Hence,  the  participation  constraint 
for the efficient 
A F  is also satisfied when the message space is restricted. There exists a 
{ } 1 ( )
n
i i b θ
=   such  that  { } ( , ) ( ) max ( , ), ( , )
a a a m B m m π θ θ π θ π θ + ≥ .  The  same  reasoning 
applies for an inefficient 
A F  and for all the firms in market B. The collusive incentive 
compatibility constraints are unaffected and all the constraints are therefore satisfied. 
 
  Hence,  from  the  regulator’s  perspective  there  is  no  restriction  in  offering  a 
message space { } ,
T T m m  instead of     since the pair is incentive feasible and all other 
messages are never played.  
 
Truthful Mechanisms  
 
  Now  we  need  to  prove  that  there  is  no  restriction  on  focusing  on  truthful 
mechanisms. From before we have seen that there are only two possible messages { } , θ θ . 
Therefore we have three possible responses from the coalition when it comes to choosing 
the report to the regulator: either it always announces the same type, independently of 
A F ’s true costs (which can also be implementable through a truthful mechanism), it may 
decide to make a different announcement given  
A F ’s type (which directly corresponds 
to a truthful mechanism) or the coalition randomizes on the two messages in at least one 
state of nature. Hence, it is sufficient to prove that no randomization will take place to 
prove that there is no loss of generality to focus only on truthful mechanisms. 
  Randomization only occurs if the coalition’s total profits are identical for both 
messages in each state of nature, i.e., 39 
  ( ) ( )
2 2
1
( , ) ( , ) ,   
n
a a a a b b a
i i
i
q q π θ θ π θ θ θ
=
  − = − ∀     ∑  
  Since the regulator’s Welfare only depends on 
a q  (since 
b
i q  is a function of this 
quantity)  and  on  the  transfers 
a t ,  we  have  that  only  one  of  the  possible  two  pairs 
{ } ( ), ( )
a a q t θ θ  and  { } ( ), ( )
a a q t θ θ  is therefore preferred by the regulator. Hence, if we 
assume that the coalition is indifferent between the two pairs, the regulator can always 
offer some additional transfer of  ε  (which s approximately zero) for the message that 
will  entail  a  higher  Welfare.  Hence,  there  is  no  restriction  in  considering  truthful 
mechanisms. 
 
Lemma 2: There is no loss of generality in considering that only direct and truthful (C-
incentive feasible) mechanisms are offered to the coalition. 
 
A.5. Computational Simulation 
 
  Although comparing equilibrium quantities is not as algebraically demanding as 
comparing Social Welfare and Consumer Surplus for the Collusion-Proof and Collusion-
Allowing equilibria, we have decided to use graphical representations to illustrate them 
which result from computational simulation using Matlab.   
  For parameters we have defined for firm 
A F  that  2
a d θ − =  and that  1
a d θ − =  
and furthermore that  0.4 p = , as in Aubert and Pouyet (2006). For the unregulated sector 
a  vector  of  costs  was  assumed  such  that  for  the  most  efficient  firm  we  had  that 
1 2
b b d θ − =  and for the most inefficient unregulated firm we had that  1
b b
n d θ − = . This 
means that the regulated firm 
A F  would always at the same level of the most efficient or 
the most inefficient firm of the unregulated sector.  Later on the same simulation was 
done  for  a  wider  range  of  costs  for  the  unregulated  sector  where  1 2.3
b b d θ − =   and 
1.7
b b
n d θ − = .  
  The simulation was made for a range of values for the substitutability degree such 
that 0.1 0.9 s ≤ ≤  and for a number of unregulated firms between 2 and 61. After running 40 
the program we ended  up with equilibrium quantities matrices of size  ( ) s n × , which 
fulfilled  non-negativity  constraints.  We  have  then  used  these  values  to  plug  into  the 
Social  Welfare  and  Consumer  Surplus  functions  to  compare  them  over  this  two 
dimensions.  
  The results for the first vector of marginal costs for the unregulated sector are 
present  in  the  text. When  we  consider  the  wider  range  of  costs  for  theses  firms,  the 
graphical results are as follows: 
 
Social Welfare Comparison 
 
 









Welfare Difference: AC - CP
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Welfare Difference: AC - CP

























  As we can see from the graphs presented above, having a wider range of costs fro 
the unregulated sector would translate into higher levels of Social Welfare differences. 
This means that when firm 
A F  is no longer the most efficient nor the least efficient in the 
market, the Collusion-Allowing Contracts will yield an even better Social Welfare value, 









Consumer Surplus Comparison 
 











Consumer Surplus Difference: AC - CP

























Consumer Surplus Difference: AC - CP




















  The above diagrams show that also in this case we have negative values for the 
Consumer Surplus difference, which are increasing in the number of unregulated firms in 
the  market  and  decreasing  with  the  substitutability  degree,  similarly  to  the  results 
obtained  previously  for  a  smaller  range  of  the  unregulated  firms’  marginal  costs. 
Furthermore, the Consumer Surplus differences are approximately the same as before 
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! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ . ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿
’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿, ￿ $ ￿￿’￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿# # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
: ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿/￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿( ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿A # ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿B C ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿D ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿= ￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿￿￿A ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿ & ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F ￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2 & ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿G￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# ￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2 & ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
’￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ & ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿ * ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿
; ￿￿# ￿￿￿2￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 2 & ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2 & ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
# ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2 & ￿ -) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿     ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿￿￿H￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿I￿￿ ￿3 ￿￿￿C ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿B ￿￿ & ￿’￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿ = ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = ￿
% + ’D ￿ + % + ’7￿￿ 2 2 $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ -￿ ￿ & E ￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ! ￿
5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ $ . ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   * ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ $ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿% ￿# ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿
￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   /￿
’￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   1 ￿
￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿( ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ￿￿
’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿.4 ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿ .
￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿# # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿
% ￿ $ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ < ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ￿￿
’￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿ & ￿ F ￿￿ ￿ & ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿# ￿￿￿2￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿
￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿
; ￿ & 0 . ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ 4 $ ￿ ￿ ￿G￿ ￿ ￿ H￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ $ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ !   ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! ! ￿
8 ￿ 9 ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿; ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿
; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! * ￿
’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿% ￿# ￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! /￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ C ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   $ ￿￿￿￿# ￿= ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿
  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿ F ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ & ￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! 1 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ I ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ J ￿ ￿J ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
2￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿
’￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ & 0 . ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ 4 $ ￿ ￿ ￿G￿ ￿ ￿ H￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ .￿ ￿ .# ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ .￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿